COMMENTARIES

LYING TO CLIENTS FOR ECONOMIC GAIN OR
PATERNALISTIC JUDGMENT: A PROPOSAL FOR A
GOLDEN RULE OF CANDOR
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOWt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Lisa Lerman's article, Lying to Clients,' raises very important
questions and answers them in part. She asks if the provisions of the
ethical codes prohibit lawyers from ever lying to their clients,2 why
do lawyers lie (she tells us with exploratory empirical data that they
clearly do'), and in what circumstances can they justify such
behavior.
Her reports from twenty interviewed lawyers 4 tell us that lawyers are most likely to deceive clients in trying to get business (puffing or exaggerating their expertise and experience), keeping
business (failing to disclose their mistakes, "falsely" impressing clients, failing to disclose accurately the progress of work, and engaging in strategic deception in casework), and making money from
business (billing practices). She reviews the justifications that might
be offered for such deceptive practices, adopting a philosophical, if
not economic, cost and benefit analysis, by analyzing the harms and
benefits "caused" by such deception. She engages us briefly in the
important professional ethics issue of whether specific regulation or
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; Acting Co-Director,
UCLA Center for the Study of Women. A.B. 1971, Barnard College, J.D. 1974,
University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Robert Meadow and David Dolinko for their
critical comments and suggestions.
I Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659 (1990).

2 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 8.4, 1.4, 2.1 (1983); MODEL

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (A)(4) (1981).

3 See Lerman, supra note 1, at 705-44.
4 A group that hardly can be called a sample of anything other than some
lawyers who agreed to talk about lawyer deception. The numbers are small; the
lawyers may easily represent a biased group-those willing to talk about some forms
of deception. Professor Lerman calls this "casual empiricism." As a social scientist, I
prefer to call this an exploratory study.
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hortatory standards are best suited to encouraging good behavior on
the part of lawyers.
Professor Lerman concludes her discussion of these issues with
some suggested new ethical rules that would require greater candor
than lawyers seem now to be providing, particularly with reference to
their billing practices, 5 their self-presentation for purposes of
obtaining clients, 6 and their reports to clients about the progress of
work for which they have contracted. 7 She also suggests that rules
about reporting ethical violations should be modified. Rather than
requiring lawyers to "snitch" on each other to disciplinary committees,8 they should instead confront each other, with the lawyer per9
ceiving the ethical violation suggesting alternative courses of action.
I think these suggestions are sound and I would support them, if
asked to, by the appropriate disciplinary legislative body in my
state. t 0
5 See Lerman, supra note 1, at 749-52.
6 See id. at 753-54.
7 See id. at 755-56.
8 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.3; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 1-103(A).
9 See Lerman, supra note 1, at 756-57. Professor Lerman suggests that if one

lawyer is junior to another the duty to confront can be transferred to another, more
senior member of the firm. Though it is beyond the scope of this Comment, the

question of responsibility for the conduct of lawyers within the supervisory chain is
an important one, demanding further consideration. In drafting the Model Rules, the
Kutak Commission provided junior lawyers with the "defense" that they relied on

"reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty," MODEL RULE
5.2(b). The junior lawyer thus is offered the defense in any subsequent disciplinary
proceeding that she "was simply following orders" (and ethical rules!). I disagree
with this hierarchical and allegedly "more realistic" approach to legal
decisionmaking because it inscribes a lack of professional responsibility in servility to
law firm stratification. As a teacher of professional responsibility, I find this approach
particularly troubling because I see the most junior lawyers, who have been educated
after Watergate and subject to new ABA standards requiring instruction in
professional responsibility, as the most equipped to make sound ethical judgments.
See ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAw ScHooLs Standard 302(a)(iv)(1988). The
junior lawyers not only know the rules much better than their seniors, but they may
be better able to detect ethical conflicts because their attachments to important
clients tend to be weaker.
10 Although the ABA "promulgates" ethical rules, these do not have the force
of law unless the appropriate state body enacts them into law. In some states this is
the Supreme Court, in others the legislature and in still others the State Bar itself, or
some disciplinary committee is delegated such authority. In California, all of these
bodies play some role in ethical regulation. See CAL. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule
1-100 (West 1989) (adopted by the State Bar and approved by the State Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6067-68, 610018, 6125-33, 6150-55 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989) (statutes regulating, respectively,
the attorney's oath and duty, authority of Supreme Court to discipline attorney,
unlawful, practice of law, and unlawful solicitation of legal business).
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Nevertheless, I believe there are other important issues about
lying to one's clients that Professor Lerman has not discussed in her
article which deserve attention. Underlying Professor Lerman's
analysis is the acceptance and recognition of law as business 1 1 and
the need to adopt, as it were, "fair business practice acts," which is
how I read her proposals. This is important because, in this era of
deregulation, law appears to be a business sorely needing regulation.12 On the other hand, law remains a profession as well, one that
is still called "learned" by some nostalgics like myself who believe
that standards of honesty and candor should be higher than what we
might tolerate as a fair business practice in the open market.
In this Comment, therefore, I will suggest that in addition to
Professor Lerman's conceptualization of the ethics implicated in economic market aspects of lawyering, there may be other issues we
should look at, as well, in assessing when and about what lawyers
may "lie," "mislead," or "deceive" their clients."3 My aim here is
twofold-to express a simple moral standard for analyzing lawyer
I I There is nothing new about this observation. Several recent articles in the
NationalLaw Journaland American Lawyer reported on such items as partner incomes,
rankings of law firms in terms of billings, size, etc. A recent outpouring of more
systematic scholarship has sought to understand changes in legal practice in terms of
both demographics and economics. See, e.g., Sander & Williams, Why Are There So
Many Lawyers? Perspectives On A Turbulent Market, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 431 (1989)
(demographic analysis); Galanter & Palay, The Transformation of the Large Law
Firm (paper presented to American Bar Foundation Conference on Professionalism,
Ethics and Economic Change, September, 1988) (on file with University of Pennsylvania
Law Review).
12 Law is big business, accounting for about 1% of the total United States Gross
National Product-approximately 54 billion dollars worth of business per year as of
1986 (making it larger than the steel and textile industries and comparable to auto
manufacture and publishing). See Sander & Williams, supra note 11, at 434.
13 The majority of Professor Lerman's interviews focus on dealings with
individual, fee-paying clients. See Lerman, supra note 1, at 703-44. Many lawyers,
however, are on a salary paid by third parties, such as those who are employed by
legal aid programs, public interest firms, governmental entities, and pre-paid
insurance plans. See C. Serron, Managing Legal Services: The Transformation of
Small-Firm Practice (paper presented to American Bar Foundation Conference on
Professionalism, Ethics, and Economic Change, September, 1988) (discussing prepaid insurance plans) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law Review). To the
extent that those lawyers deceive their clients, the subject matter of their lies and
their reasons for lying may be quite different. For the importance of context in
affecting lawyer decisionmaking, see C. Menkel-Meadow & B. Moulton, Who Decides?
Lawyer-Client Decision-Making About Dispute Resolution, in Beyond the Adversarial
Model: Materials and Cases on Negotiation and Mediation (forthcoming)
(manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Professor Lerman
herself points out that the dynamics between institutional, rather than individual,
clients and their lawyers may also affect the ranges of candor, see Lerman, supra note
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liars1 4 that can be debated on moral, as well as policy terms, and
second, to discuss briefly a number of "lying" issues that may be
overlooked when a market model of lawyering is adopted.' 5
II.

A

SIMPLE STANDARD FOR LYING: THE
GOLDEN RULE OF CANDOR

Professor Lerman offers as a rule the proposition that lawyers
should never deceive clients for any reason of self-interest. 16 I certainly agree with this rule, but I believe it fails to cover other types of
lawyer lies which are also undesirable. Therefore, I propose a
broader rule of conduct: lawyers should in all respects deal with
their clients in the way they themselves would want to be treated if
they were in the client's position. This rule goes further than do
Professor Lerman's economic regulations in dealing with both economic and non-economic deception of clients (such as strategic
deception during the course of case handling), but I think it presents
more complex problems of philosophical justification and practical
enforcement, and therefore offer this standard for further discussion
and debate. To see the advantages of this broader rule over ProfesI, at 665 n.20; see also Nelson, Ideology, Practice and Profes.sionalAutonomy: Social Values
and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985).
Lerman suggests that what she is most interested in is lawyers' selfinterestedness-their interest in income and reputation. See Lerman, supra note 1, at
667. Furthermore, Professor Lerman states that the twenty lawyers she interviewed
about deceptive practices dealt more often with "process" concerns than
"substance"-process having to do with work habits and billing practices. See id. at
670 n.41. Query whether this is really where the "deceitful" action is or whether the
lawyers were more willing to own up to it as a more "acceptable" or common form of
lying in the recognized competition to get business.
Lerman states that the thrust of her arguments are based on the failure of many
professional responsibility writers to take account of the principal lawyer-client
conflict-the lawyer's "profit motivation." Id. at 671.
14 It has become a common professional responsibility teacher's pun to adopt
(or fully utilize if one already has one) a slightly southern accent to demonstrate how
short an oral distance we must travel to go from "lawyer" to "liar."
15 I have long been interested in how non-market lawyering differs from market
or fee-paid-for-service lawyering, not only in terms of ethical strictures but in lawyer
decisionmaking and resource allocation. See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, Resource
Allocation in Legal Services: IndividualAttorney Decisions in Work Priorities, 5 LAW & POL'Y
Q. 237 (1983); see also Tremblay, Toward A Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services
Practice, (forthcoming 37 UCLA L. REV.) (1990) (forthcoming) (how different nonmarket contexts, such as the provision of legal services for the poor, may require
different decision rules and "ethical" judgments in resource allocation by lawyers);
Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public
Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978).
16 See Lerman, supra note I, at 684-85.
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sor Lerman's rule, I will first examine the rationale for her rule and
then consider why her rule will not adequately protect client interests in all situations.
A.

What's Wrong with Lying? Economic Self-Interest

Professor Lerman begins her article with several definitions and
7
degrees of lying or deceitfulness. Adopting Sissela Bok's definition'
that lying is stated untruthfulness and deception is a broader category of deliberate efforts to mislead which can occur by misstatements, non-verbal conduct, and even by silence, Professor Lerman
concludes that what is crucial is the intent to deceive. Of course, the
law currently examines intent when proscribing deception in real
estate sales, commercial practices,"8 and securities trading. In some
areas the law has gone further and creates liability for "negligent
misrepresentation," even without intent to deceive."l Thus, even
"unintentional" deception, may, in some circumstances, be something we will penalize. Most of this "commercial" regulation is
designed to protect against economic harm. We assume that if the
purchaser knew what the seller failed to disclose or actually lied
about, the purchaser would not have made the deal, or at least might
have bargained for a better price. Thus, the harm is the "unjust
enrichment" of the lying or deceiving seller.
This fairly traditional conception of harm is what underlies Professor Lerman's discussion of the harm caused by lying lawyers.
Since her interviewees lie most often out of economic self-interest,
by padding their bills, exaggerating (in either direction depending
on the circumstances) the amount of time and effort put into their
work, and puffing about their experience and expertise, 20 we come
to see a picture of clients who are paying more than they should for
legal services and perhaps also (though this cannot really be concluded from the data Lerman presents) getting either too little or too
much service. Lerman concludes with a fairly simple rule: "Self17 See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 14 (1978).
18 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1572 (West 1982) (making actual intent to deceive

an essential element of an action for fraud).
19 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1710(2) (West 1985) (proscribing negligent
misrepresentation as a category of deceit, as contrasted to intentional fraud (Cal. Civ.
Code § 1572)). A new statute requires affirmative, specific disclosures in real estate
transactions and provides penalties and civil causes of action for failure to
affirmatively disclose regulated matters. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102 (West Supp.
1989).
20 See Lerman, supra note 1, at 706-20; 721-23.
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interested deception of clients by lawyers should be prohibited"'"
where self-interest appears to be equated with economic self-interest. Deception for such purposes is bad, she says, because lawyers
will "appear greedy, immature, and unable to manage their time or
face up to their mistakes." 2 2
Is it only the "appearance" of greed with which we are concerned or is actual greed the real issue? Why is deception for selfinterest objectionable, both in the professional context as well as in
the more general human context? Given the regulation of honest disclosure in many commercial transactions, is there any reason to
exempt the professional-client relation? Indeed, many would argue
that law in particular should not be a sharp practices, anything-themarket-will-bear, sort of business precisely because there is something unseemly about a "helping" profession maximizing profits
from the legal "pains" of their clients? 2 3 In other words, while I
completely agree with Professor Lerman that lawyers should not
deceive out of self-interest, the rationales for such a moral belief
seem much deeper than they appear here. To the extent that deceiving another is considered "unfair" in our economic and legal system,
we need to look at what unfair practices are punished and which are
not. Professor Lerman's proposed rules requiring lawyers to be
truthful in their billing practices and product (or service) advertisements seem entirely consistent with our general approach to fair
trade practices in commercial transactions generally. Thus, they
should hardly seem controversial. Lawyers, in their economic capacities, should be treated no differently than other producers of products or providers of services.
Our economic and moral system seems, as Professor Lerman
points out, to be process-based. Let consumers have as good information as we can provide at the beginning of transactions, but we
will not insure that everyone actually makes a fair deal, the rules
seem to be saying. Such a morality explains why some of the proposals for new ethics rules, which would have required the prevention of
21 Id. at 685.
22

Id.

23 This is, of course, exactly what lawyers (and doctors) do. Contingent fees in
personal injury cases are the most obvious examples, but all fees derived from
litigation can be seen this way. Is it therefore morally better or more excusable to
make more money from a client's profitable transaction (a percentage of a successful
deal)? What if the deal goes bad? It is commonplace for journalists to report the
large legal fees in failed deals (such as United Airlines recent failed take-over, and the
many bankruptcies that do not result in successful reorganization).
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"unconscionable" transactions by lawyers, 24 ultimately failed. Thus,
if lawyers honestly disclose their billing practices and fees, the substance of the deal made will be scrutinized only in the most extreme
cases. 25 Thus, Professor Lerman's proposed regulations for honesty
in billing and economic matters seem premised on conventional
principles of commercial and consumer transactions, as evidenced by
our movement in legal development from caveat emptor to caveat
venditor. The proposals here do nothing more than track the legal
developments of commercial regulation.
B.

When Is LyingJustified: A PaternalisticDetermination of Benefits and
Harms to the Client

In moving from the application of consumer law principles to
the analysis of the economic relation between lawyer and client, Professor Lerman asks under what circumstances can lawyers lie to their
clients. She suggests a commonly articulated utilitarian justification
for some deceptions-the benefit to the client that occurs as a consequence of the deception is greater than the harm. Thus, we have
"altruistic deception."2 6 Lawyers seem to justify their "misstatements" about the progress of a legal matter by suggesting that they
are helping their clients avoid needless worry about the progress of
their case. 2 7 Here we face several difficulties. What if some "benefit"
to the client can be rationalized to protect or coincide with a selfinterested motive of the lawyer, such as in the progress report example above? Benefits and burdens do not always fall so neatly and
symmetrically on opposite sides of the ledger.
More problematic, however, is the determination that must be
made about what benefits the client and who makes judgments about
those benefits. Professor Lerman discusses two examples taken from
24 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 4.2, 4.3 (Discussion
Draft, Jan. 30, 1980), which would have required lawyers to be "fair" in dealing with
other participants to a negotiation and would have prevented a lawyer from
participating in or assisting another in participating in an unconscionable agreement.
25 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1981)
(prohibiting the charging of "clearly excessive fees"); EC 2-17 (should not charge
more than a reasonable fee); EC 2-19 (should discuss and agree with client on basis
of fees in advance); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1989)
(fees must be reasonable and basis of fee must be disclosed at outset of the
representation).
26 An analysis along this consequentialist line of reasoning persuades many

philosophers, including Sissela Bok, that at least some lying is justified-such as lying
to avoid harm to others or even to cause benefits, if no other is harmed.
27 See Lerman, supra note 1, at 684.
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outside of the economic emphasis of her article. The lawyer who
decides not to pass on "nasty" remarks made by a spouse during
divorce proceedings may be withholding information, but does so to
prevent greater harm (insult, aggravation, hurt) to the client. Might
not the motivation also be that if the client knew of the nasty remark
she might want to respond and cause more (acrimonious) work for
the lawyer? What if the client actually would decide to settle the case
because she wanted no further dealings with the "nasty" spouse?
Thus, the lawyer's judgments about sparing the client from hearing
"bad" information might have ramifications for how the case is pursued. The substance of the case and how it is handled cannot be separated from the information in question. In giving the client the
"benefit" of not hearing painful information, the lawyer also usurps
the client's ability to make judgments about how she wants her case
handled. Note here that the lawyer's monetary interest might not be
consistent with other "self-interests"-the lawyer might make more
money from the additional work (depending on the fee arrangements) but might find the work unpleasant.2 8
Professor Lerman suggests that in such cases lawyers and clients
can contract for the withholding of information in advance (a further
inscription of the market model of lawyering). But, can they possibly
know in advance what information will need to be withheld to avoid
harm to the client? If the lawyer is in doubt who should she ask? The
client? A family member? Another lawyer?
In another example (one that I too encountered in practice), the
lawyer learns that the client has a terminal illness (in a social security
disability case) and the doctor has decided not to inform the client/
patient.2 9 Who decides whether to inform the client-the lawyer, the
doctor, the client's relatives (assuming there are some-in my case
there were not)? What is the harm/benefit to the client in learning
about impending death?
Both of these cases involve paternalism, perhaps beneficently
motivated paternalism, 3" but paternalism none the less. How is the
28 This depends on where the lawyer practices. In Los Angeles County, where I
teach, practice, and live, many seem to think divorce lawyers revel in and indeed
increase the acrimony in divorce. See Nasty, Nasty, Nasty: High Profile Divorce Wars Are
Symbols of What Has Become A Tough Erafor Relationships, L.A. Times, Dec. 8, 1989, at E1.
29 See Lerman, supra note I, at 684 n.92.
30 I use the more common phrase paternalism here for this familiar concept but
note the gendered aspect of this term. The phrase maternalism often connotes
different emphases in such decisionmaking. See generally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE (1982); S. RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING (1988); Menkel-Meadow, PortiaIn A
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lawyer who decides to withhold information to avoid harm to the
client to be judged or second-guessed? Are there different standards
for professionals in such situations than would be applied to any person who has information about another human being that might be
shared with that person?
As one guideline, I am reminded of one of my favorite moments
in professional socialization. Sometime in the early 1960s, on the
Doctor Kildare television program, young Doctor Kildare asks old
and wise Dr. Gillespe whether he should truthfully tell a patient she
has a terminal disease. Dr. Gillespe offers the following tip: If the
patient asks "Am I going to live, doctor?" the patient wants to live
and should not be told of imminent death; if the patient says "I'm
going to die, aren't I doctor?," the patient is a realist who can take it,
and you can tell the truthY.1 Here, the experienced professional
paternalist seems to be advising Doctor Kildare, based on his many
years of experience-he knows what messages patients really convey
with their questions. He can save Doctor Kildare much time and
angst by decoding their needs and wants for them. As an incipient
patient I learned my lesson well-if ever I wanted the truth from my
doctor I would have to convince her I could "handle" it.
This approach did not help me with my own dying client in the
social security disability case. She lived alone in a large city. I did not
think she could "handle" it-but I thought she had the right to
decide how to spend her last remaining months on earth. As a lawyer
I wanted her to understand the significance of the hearing she had to
go to and that she might have wanted to make a will. (Ultimately her
hearing was called off-her case was so clear she received her disability benefits on the paper record. She died two months later. I felt
closer to her than many of my clients because we had shared this
terrible human moment of mortality). Did I make the right decision?
Different Voice: Speculations On a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S

L.J.

39

(1985).
31 These are not exact words, but my own recollection of them. The point of
this anecdote is that it demonstrates how relative and contextual our judgments
about truth telling might be. Given medical advances and changes in therapies,
including biofeedback, the patient who wants to live might now be told the truth
under Gillepse's system of morality: if knowing the gravity of the illness induces the
patient to take her recovery into her own hands, the chances of actually recovering
are much greater. See, e.g., N. CoUsINS, ANATOMY OF AN ILLNESS 34-48 (1979).
Medical research about terminal illness indicates that over a twenty-five year period,
practices about truth-telling have changed radically. Now over 70% of physicians
surveyed do tell their patients while only twenty-four years ago 82% did just the
opposite. See Radovsky, "Occasional Notes: Bearing the News, 313 N. ENG. J. MED. 586
(1985).
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Is Doctor Gillespe right in deciding, as a doctor with many years of
experience, that he knows what is best? The problem for me in any
rule that allows us to do that which benefits or does not harm others
is that it is ultimately a decision one makesfor another and our basis
for judging such decisions are unclear.
C.

The Golden Rule of Candor

Paternalism in ethical codes and rules, as well as in lay action,
must be justified morally. Thus, it seems that paternalism must be
judged in part on the basis of who makes the paternalistic decision.
In deciding whether or not the truth should be told, a lawyer, doctor,
social worker, nurse, and yes, even a lay person, might begin with the
inquiry: Would I want to be told this information if I were the client/patient?

In one sense this inquiry violates Professor Lerman's rule because
the professional self is the referent. In that sense, decisions about
whether to tell the truth are "self-interested."
Yet, I suspect this "self-interested" standard might lead to more
truthtelling. In part, this depends on whether it is the lawyer as person who asks the question or whether it is the lawyer as professional
who does. There may be more than one 'self' implicated. I propose
such a standard because I think it will aid in resolving both the economic deception cases and cases in which lawyers engage in other
forms of deception. In addition, I think such a standard would
enable the lawyer to empathize with the client and take the client's
needs in the relationship more seriously3 2 by causing the lawyer to
have to imagine what it would be like to be in the client's shoes, for
purposes of getting information.
Let's apply such a standard to the common problems Professor
32 This is a sort of irony in lawyer-client relations and in some sense turns the
client-centered decisionmaking notion on its head. For discussions of the traditional
client-centered approach, see D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING (1977); Maute, Allocation ofDecisionmakingAuthority Under the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049 (1984); cf ElIman, Lawyers and Clients,
34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 753-58 (1987) (acknowledging fact that even lawyers who
seek to be client-centered must sometimes manipulate their clients, and discussing
various situations in which such manipulation might be justified). I have argued
elsewhere that "client-centeredness" may not be appropriate in all cases, such as
when clients are quite powerful and may dominate lawyers, for economic as well as
other reasons, and in cases in which the lawyer might actually know more about a
particular decision and its effects than a client (such as what dispute resolution device
to use in some cases). See C. Menkel-Meadow & B. Moulton, supra note 13. On the
other hand, lawyer disclosure, based on a "lawyer-centered" notion of what should
be disclosed, still can lead to client-centered decisionmaking-the client will usually
have more information with which to make the decision.
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Lerman sets out. Would a lawyer want an accountant to bill honestly? Would she be willing to pay for "study hours"? (I would-I
would rather have my accountant read all the recent tax regulations
than rely on his "years of experience" in taking the proper deduction). Would a lawyer want a doctor to honestly (and not with puffery) state his expertise and experience? Professor Lerman's
proposed regulations seem appropriate, whether or not one believes
that ethical matters should be regulated by specific rules or precatory
exhortations, because they apply to lawyers the sort of "truth-inlending, truth-in-advertising, truth-in-real-estate transactions" we
now require in any number of transactions. Thus, lawyers should
clearly disclose the truth with respect to their expertise, experience,
billing practices, and progress of the case. As professionals who consume other professional services, lawyers should be particularly sensitive to such matters.
Would a lawyer want to know whether or not she is terminally
ill? This decision is a more difficult and subjective one to make, but
still likely, in most cases, to be answered yes. Lawyers in particular
might want to be able to write wills and arrange their legal and other
matters. It seems likely, however, that most people would want to
33

know.

I suspect as well that most lawyers would want the "nasty"
words of an ex-spouse to be revealed to them. Even if painful, they
are relevant both to legal and emotional decisions that a divorce client might be making. To the extent that a lawyer might want to caution a client not to take them too seriously in the context of
acrimonious divorce proceedings, the lawyer can add additional
words of advice and counsel to the reporting of the nasty words.
Thus, to the extent that a lawyer feels a paternalistic desire to withhold information, it might be useful to share the reasons with the
client as a way of dealing with what might be the benefits and burdens of disclosure and the client will be able to better understand the
meaning of what has been disclosed.
Thus, I offer the proposed standard for considering when a lawyer ought to be candid with a client: Lawyers should reveal to their clients
that which they would want revealed to them if they were clients.
What could be the objections to such a simple Golden Rule of
33 This is a problem that merits more consideration than it gets here. On the
other hand, it needs to be considered in light of medical ethics and medical practice
which have been changing since the days of Doctors Kildare and Gillespe (and the
onslaught of AIDS and related diseases) to more forthcoming medical practices,
leaving fewer lawyers with these dilemmas.

772

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:761

Candor? I honestly cannot imagine any with respect to the kinds of
economic self-interest issues raised by Professor Lerman and thus, to
the extent that her proposed regulations seem to legislate such standards, I support them. Perhaps they seem so supportable to me
because California has already begun to regulate with respect to fee
disclosure (not exclusively in the ethical codes-in the Business and
Professions Codes as well), requiring written documentation of fee
arrangements, among other requirements.3 4
There might be objections to such regulations based on their
enforceability, an argument Professor White used some time ago to
justify the absence of stricter rules with respect to lying in the negotiation context.3" Here, the argument goes that if rules are not
enforced, the credibility of the entire rule system may suffer as a
result. Others, notably my colleague, Professor Murray Schwartz,
have argued that rules that seek to achieve high aspirational standards express the best in the profession and tell us when we fall
below those standards.3 6 Such rules would apply even to what Professor Lerman has called "altruistic" (economic) deception-the case
of the lawyer that bills a paying client more and thereby subsidizes a
pro bono activity.3 7 While such Robin Hood lawyering might seem
34 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6146-49 (West Supp. 1989) (providing
various rules about fees and disclosures, and requiring that fee arrangements be in
writing); CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-200 (1989) (prohibiting
unconscionable fee agreements).
35 See White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 926. Professor White's argument was that if rules go too
far afield from generally accepted practice they will be disobeyed and decrease the
effectiveness and credibility of all ethical rule systems. See id. at 937. He also argued
that the particular context of negotiation was so varied in different types of cases and
in different regions of the country that it would be virtually impossible to create a
uhiformly acceptable standard of truthtelling in legal negotiations. See id. at 927. In
addition, Professor White argued that most negotiations are conducted privately and
it would be difficult in many cases to uncover and prove situations of deceit. See id. at
926. This seems a logical argument from a distinguished commercial law scholar
who has also studied the realities of commercial practice.
As a teacher of negotiation my own views are different from Professor White and
closer to those of Professor Murray Schwartz and Judge Alvin Rubin. See infra note
36 and accompanying text (Schwartz' views); Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyer's Ethics in
Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 589 (1975) ("The lawyer must act honestly and in
good faith."). In short, I think lawyers' lies to other lawyers ought also to be
regulated and governed by Golden Rule standards but my exposition on that issue
must await another day.
36 See Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
953, 963 ("Standards of performance that exceed the minimum, standards that set
achievement goals, should be promulgated. They should be made known so that all
lawyers can measure their conduct against them ... .
37 See Lerman, supra note 1, at 709-10.
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noble to some, the lawyer as client would clearly like to know she is
doing a noble thing by subsidizing pro bono work. Indeed, the client
who is told about such opportunities might actually encourage it,
either for the moral good of it or from the instrumental tax deductibility of it.
There are more difficult issues with some non-economic decisionmaking. Would a client like to be told everything about a particular procedure? Different people do have different values, desires,
etc. about the need for detail or what might upset them. Consider
whether the patient wants to know all the gruesome details of an
operation and whether a client really wants to know all the details
about the path to having a motion decided. Some lawyers might
actually have different standards than their clients and thus application of their own values to their clients would be a particularly onerous sort of paternalism. Still, I think the expressions of paternalistic
standards that suggest that the lawyer should try to figure out what is
best for the client (as the lawyer determines it, even if the lawyer uses
a client-centered counseling model3 8 ) frequently hide the fact that
the lawyer inevitably is making judgments of her own. Doctor Gillespe's rule is expressly client-centered-it just abstracts clients into
one of two categories. (What if the smart patient simply asks the doctor an open-ended question: "What is my fate?", "What illness do I
have?", "How long will I live?", or "What's happening to me, doctor?"). Doctor Gillespe's rule obviously vests the decision whether
to tell the truth in the doctor. Thus, my claim for a golden rule of
truth at least provides a standard, albeit a subjective one, for judging
whether the truth should be told. I believe that if lawyers truly confronted their self-interest as if they were clients, not lawyers, they
would find the moral road in practice clearer (not necessarily easier
to practice).
The Golden Rule approach would clearly be objected to by
those like Professor Ted Schneyer, who think that moral guidelines
for behavior are inadequate in the legal ethics context and specific
regulations are necessary.3 9 The standard I suggest is a particularly
38 In either its purest form, see D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 32, or its more
manipulative form. See Ellman, supra note 32.
39 See, e.g., Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's StandardMisconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
Wis. L. REv. 1529, 1571 (arguing that "simply tinkering with ethics rules, or even
with lawyers' moral sensibilities" will not counter the pressures on lawyers to unduly
favor their clients over third parties, and that reformers should study "the constraints
and incentives that operate on lawyers in various settings and... [the] measures that
might be taken to alter those constraints and incentives").

774

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:761

problematic one, precisely because of its subjectivity. As Professor
Lerman points out, the implicit assumption in such objections is that
without specific and enforceable regulation, lawyers will always
choose the less ethical route.40
Whether a lawyer could use this double-visioned standard of
considering herself a lawyer and client at the same time is difficult to
assess. Aside from a sort of existential schizophrenia there may actually be cases where real role conflicts would get in the way. Would a
recovering alcoholic lawyer disclose his condition to a client? As a
client he might want to know, but being able to present himself as a
sober professional might be essential to his recovery and effectiveness as an attorney. In other cases, there may be information only
the lawyer knows is available because she is a lawyer (like some procedural matters), so it is the lawyer's knowledge qua lawyer that
would have to be applied to the decision of whether to tell the client.
III.

THE OTHER LIES THAT LAWYERS TELL: LYING
BEYOND THE MARKET

Professor Lerman's focus on when and how lawyers lie to their
clients is important and significant, and if her exploratory interviews

could be replicated more systematically, we might learn whether
lying about professional self-interest in the form of economics and
reputation is in fact the most common form of deception. Before we
40 See Lerman, supra note 1, at 749-50. This argument has never been
persuasive to me. When I moved to California after some years of practice and
teaching (including ethics) in another state (Pennsylvania) I had to sit for the
Attorney's Bar Exam, which included the MPRE (Multi-state Professional
Responsibility Exam). I was advised by a well meaning practitioner friend, in cases of
doubt about a question, to pick "the second most ethical answer." His advice was
that the rules never required "the most ethical" conduct because there was always a
lawyer's loophole in the rules-like client consent to seemingly inappropriate
behavior (as in conflicts of interests) or lawyer protection of self (in exceptions to the
confidentiality rule). This has proved remarkably robust advice and actually provides
a useful tip for many students studying the rules for the MPRE. The only questions
whose answers are quite clear involve fees and escrow accounts (supporting
Professor Lerman's proposals to regulate more clearly about billing and fee
practices). The regulations, therefore, do not in my view insure "'the most ethical"
conduct and I think there are areas where we clearly need the kind of general moral
guidelines that moral philosophers would have us consider. I cannot resist pointing
out that the California Bar Examiners have decided that the MPRE has proven
somewhat too mechanical for testing ethics. Beginning this year, in addition to the
MPRE, the California Bar Exam now includes ethical questions on the essay portion
of the exam so that test takers must explicate their ethical choices. If ethics is going
to be on the bar, this seems the sensible approach to me and one that is consistent
with the sort of discretionary rule I am proposing here.
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learn that, however, I would like to explore some of the types of
deception that might occur in situations outside of the economic
market for legal services to see whether the simple golden rule of
truth will serve as a guide in those cases as well. Some of the situations described below may also occur in private practice and have
implications for how such cases are handled, but they are not as
directly related to the economic nexus between lawyer and client that
is the focus of so much of Professor Lerman's article. In short, we
might ask what distinguishes a lawyer lie from any other kind of service provider lie? What do lawyers in particular lie about that is different in content from how any businessperson might "lie" about
their services or products?
The easiest cases are those in which issues in public or non-market lawyering are the same as in fee-for-service lawyering: deception
to clients about progress on work (delay), misrepresentation of
expertise or experience, failure to disclose mistakes made in work,
and the kind of strategic deception that Professor Lerman describes
when a lawyer inadequately prepares a witness in order to preserve
spontaneity on the witness stand. 41 To the extent that Professor
Lerman's proposed regulations deal with these issues, they would
clearly cover the government, salaried, or public interest lawyer.4 2
More difficult are those issues which revolve around the fact that
non-market lawyering may involve different kinds of clients-establishing who is being deceived may be more difficult. The district
attorney who decides to authorize questionable drug arrests because
this will enhance her visibility in the community and electorate (if she
sits for elective office), even when she knows that many of the arrests
will not "stick," deceives her client-"the public." If the D.A. could
think of herself as an individual member of the public, would that
change her behavior? My guess is probably not. When the public is
the client, the connection to the lawyer as public official seems attenuated and it is hard to conceive of one individual's view as making a
difference. In addition, much of the public, and particularly a sophisticated lawyer member of the civic polity, might actually expect a certain amount of "deception" from political lawyers and public
See Lerman, supra note 1, at 736-37.
1 have some difficulty in this context (perhaps in all contexts) with a
requirement that lawyers return clients' phone calls in two days. See Lerman, supra
note 1, at 756 (proposing modification to MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.4 (1983)). Who the "client" is in some non-market contexts will not be as
clear (such as in class actions or representation of public agencies) and may require
more than two days for response.
41

42
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officials. Moreover, in the political context, a variety of contested
political justifications or interpretations of disputed law 43 could
serve to justify any number of such activities. Perhaps the fear of
arrest might actually decrease some of the drug trade. Who is to say
that following such a course is actually deceiving the public, even if
the arrests do not lead to convictions?
As fee-for-service lawyers might deceive their clients by taking
on cases that have little chance of success for economic reward,
analogous issues apply in the non-market context where political
pressure may cause a lawyer to take a case which she knows has little
chance of success but which an important member of the political
team would like initiated or defended. Here the Golden Rule of
Candor may not help us because the lawyer as client might well
understand why the suit is desired and would not want to know that
it was likely to lose (there may be reasons other than winning that
could motivate the lawsuit). Thus, the lawyer would be justified in
withholding information about the likely outcome. In addition to
posing ethical dilemmas of candor, these situations present versions
of the "role morality" problem, long applied to lawyers, 44 but also
applicable to politicians and particularly to lawyer-politicians. Can
occupants of particular roles in our society-lawyers, soldiers, politicians-defend their actions on the basis of what the role requires of
45
them?
Oddly enough, like the lawyer who wants to maximize income,
the public interest lawyer who wants to maximize law reform or personal reputation 4 6 may find herself in trouble with the Golden Rule
of Candor. To the extent that the lawyer may use a different form of
self-interest, usually expressed as altruistic or political interest, in
bringing lawsuits to change rules or to enforce present ones, the
Golden Rule of Candor would require such lawyers to fully disclose
43 Could a lawyer here argue that she was attempting to test the limits of the law
or was advancing a claim "for the good faith argument for an extension, modification
of reversal of existing law?" See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1
(1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1981).
44 See Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES
AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 26-27 (D. Luban ed. 1983) (discussing how lawyers escape
criticism for using morally objectionable methods in representing clients because of
the demands of their role).

45 See id.; Walzer, PoliticalAction: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB.AFF.
160, 179 (1973) ("Moral rules are not usually enforced against the sort of actor I am
considering, largely because he acts in an official capacity.").
46 See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 15, at 240-46 (discussing the
factors that affect motivations of one group of non-market lawyers in performing
legal work).
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their motivations to clients who may be acting in named representative capacity, such as in a class action. Without repeating the voluminous literature on the potential of the class action reform suit to
"use" and "manipulate" clients,4 7 the danger here is of the lawyer
who fails to fully disclose to the particular client all of the risks and
benefits of such lawsuits. The most obvious conflict occurs when a
settlement is offered to a particular client or named plaintiff as a way
of "buying" off and dismissing the lawsuit. In my view, the Golden
Rule would require no more than is already on the rule book-the
lawyer must disclose all that might happen as best she can. Indeed,
the use of the Golden Rule might actually facilitate candor for the
lawyer would be free to say, "I think this is a very important matter
and you could personally help the situation by participating in the
lawsuit (and not settling). I might do the same thing if I were in your
shoes." This forces the lawyer to be candid about his own "vicarious
altruism" and to see if the client shares similar altruistic values. If
not, the lawyer must also recognize when individual self-interest
might lead the lawyer-as-client to want to settle. Such candor might
actually increase the "mutual political commitment" leading to
"comradeship" in the lawyer-client relationship4 8 that forms the
basis of a golden rule in the first place-an empathetic understanding of the other, in this case across roles. On the other hand, in such
public interest cases, applying the Golden Rule of Candor might be.
more difficult because of the particular power imbalance that exists,
particularly in cases where clients are low-income or otherwise vulnerable and do not control the lawyer through economic interests.
Here a lawyer even suggesting that "if a client" he would pursue a
particular action, might be particularly hard for the client to resist.
This is not really a problem of candor, however, but one of power
relations and dominance in the professional role. Again the lawyer
may have to be particularly vigilant to disclose more, rather than less,
information to be sure the client understands as much as is possible
what interests are to be served in the case and the actions taken
within the case.
"Public" lawyers, those in the government and those fighting
government, may also take advantage of another form of "deception"--using the media to "try" cases publicly and thereby manipulate results. This is a possibility for private market lawyers too, but
access to the media may be greater in public interest cases. Here the
See, e.g., D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
48 These phrases are David Luban's. See id. at 324-25.
47

STUDY

317-57 (1988).
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lawyer deceives a general "client"-the public in the case of public
lawyers-but may also go beyond her own client to manipulate or
deceive the jury and the larger public as well. Such lawyers not only
deceive their clients, but often bring their clients into the "deception" or manipulation by encouraging them to present themselves
and their stories to the media for the purpose of self-interested gain
in a lawsuit.
To the extent that public4 9 or public interest lawyers are supposed to be working for something other than the bottom line, their
commitment to public service, fiduciary representation, and political
and social change, their motivations may be different than those
seeking monetary gain.50 Because lawyers, like all human beings, act
to maximize self-interest, even if that self-interest is defined in altruistic terms, public and public interest lawyers may deceive their clients (and themselves) by attempting to maximize their nonmonetary goals. The ambitious prosecutor who manipulates cases
and media to gain fame and the public interest lawyer who, instead
of "cooling out" the client," encourages the client to pursue a claim
on behalf of others, are both engaged in their own forms of lying to
clients.
Lawyers may also deceive by silence in the advice they give their
clients, not only in the obvious form of not stating their own views,
49 By "public" lawyers I mean those who work for the government and are thus
invested with some notion of working for the public trust-an often amorphous and
diffuse concept and clientele. This is to be distinguished in my view from public

interest lawyers, though there is some overlap. Thus, prosecutors are clearly public
lawyers, but some think they should be excluded from the public interest category
when they act to enforce the status quo. The public interest lawyer is often, but not
always, outside of a formal institutional structure and may or may not work for a

salary. Most would include legal services lawyers and public defenders among the
public interest bar, but these categories are fluid, controversial, and ever-changing.
50 The Milton Bradley game of Careers has always captured my sense of the
different motivations lawyers bring to their diverse career goals and tasks. Early in

the game players identify their own personal goals in terms of Hearts (love), Dollar
Signs (money) and/or Stars (Fame), thus defining their own criteria of success. In the
real world of legal careers it seems the public interest lawyers have chosen hearts and
stars over dollars (perhaps a political symbol of a gavel or hammer should be added

to provide the option of choosing social change).
51 This phrase comes from the sociologist Erving Goffman who used it in
referring to the manipulation of prisoners and other "inmates" of social institutions.

See E. GOFFMAN,

STRATEGIC INTERACTION

(1969); E.

GOFFMAN,

AsyLuMs (1961). The

term has been applied to the practice of lawyers persuading clients to accept
settlements, by manipulating or deceiving them into thinking their case is worth less
than they think. See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS
FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978).
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but by failing to express perspectives on the morality, 5 2 as well as the
prudence, of a particular course of action. Here the lawyer
"deceives" by saying nothing when in fact she has a particular view
about what should be done. While this form of deception undoubtedly exists in private representation as well, the cash nexus of the
relationship might actually improve candor-a client who wants to
"buy" the lawyer's opinion can probably extract it for a price. The
client of the public lawyer has no equivalent leverage.
Like the private lawyers of big law firms, public lawyers are also
subject to the context in which they work. Thus, the social structure
of lawyering in large bureaucratic units5 3 may lead to organizational
practices and routinization of tasks that may deter some forms of
truth-telling and may reinforce a loss of "ownership" of lawyering
activity. The rationale that "I was only following orders," may be as
true in the large government office as in the private law firm.
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to explore all of the ways
non-market lawyers deceive their clients. We need an exploratory
study in this field, as Professor Lerman has done in the market context,54 before we can fully canvass the issues. I fear the dominance
of the market economy in lawyering has begun to dominate our
scholarship as well.5 5 This dominance may be the product of our
increasing concern that law practice in its more aspirational forms is
being corrupted by an increasing focus on the economic and business aspects of modem practice,5 6 and of our resulting desire to leg52 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1983) ("A lawyer's
representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social or moral views or activities."); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) ("Advice of a lawyer to his client need
not be confined to purely legal considerations.").
53 See Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1269,

1284-89 (1980).
54 Professor Lerman states that her sample of 20 included some government
lawyers, but virtually all of the examples she gives of deception are derived from the
market, fee-for service context (the exceptions being communications to clients
about the progress of work).
55 This is reflected not only in the focus on ethical issues in law firm practice,
but in the move in legal profession studies to focus on the large law firm. See
Galanter & Palay, supra note 11, at 1-110 (discussing the growth and change at large
law firms); Sander & Williams, supra note 11, at 435-40 (same). Journalists with such
publications as the National Law Journal and the American Lawyer are obsessed with
covering the large private law firm. Cf Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of
the Feminizationof the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 289, 306-08 (suggesting that legal scholarship on lawyers focus on other
components of legal practice-such as women in the public sector).
56 Actually this fear about the commercialization of law practice is as old as the
profession in the United States and the fears expressed today have their analogues in
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islate morality in the commercial sphere. I fear that regulation of the
essentially commercial practices that Professor Lerman writes
about-getting business (puffing), keeping business (misrepresenting work progress), and making profit from business (billing practices)-does not get at the heart of what should bother us about lying
or deceiving clients. It may also represent a false security about
"public-minded" lawyers, that because they do not have the financial
incentives of the market, they do not deceive.
Thus, by exploring the deceptions of public, as well as private
lawyers, we may get closer to what really should bother us about
deception. It is not just that clients will be "bilked" out of their
money and charged unfair prices, or will choose an incompetent lawyer, though these are real evils. What should concern us about lying
lawyers, what really matters in other words, is that lawyers are supposed to be helping and caring professionals. If they are ultimately
loyal to their clients, what does that loyalty consist of if it is based on
a possibly mendacious relationship? Would we want someone wh6 is
not truthful to us to be representing us against the world? If the
lawyer will lie or deceive the person she is serving, what will-he do
with those to whom he owes no loyalty-the lawyer on the other side,
the judge, the larger world out there? If we can't trust our lawyers,
whom can we trust?
Thus, ultimately the issue of lawyers lying to clients is one of
trust and power, two relatively simple, but important concepts. If
service is the ideal of the profession, should that service be considered appropriately carried out if the server decides what is good for
the servee? What of the ultimate imbalance in a relationship in which
the client is told to tell everything to the lawyer (and it will of course
be kept confidential5 7 ) but the lawyer may not be telling everything
to the client? This suggests that another form of the Golden Rule
might be: The lawyer should be as truthful to the client as she expects the
client to be with her. This formulation represents more fully the reciprocity imagined by the original Golden Rule. Is true reciprocity
possible in a professional-client relationship? Are professional relamany earlier periods. Compare
ASSOCIATION, .....

..

COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,

AMERICAN BAR

A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
(1986) (recent concerns) with L. FRIEDMAN,

IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:"

REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 634 (1973) (relating that during the Nineteenth

Century the "organized profession" tried to "limited entry into the field, and (above
all) tried to resist conversion of the profession into a 'mere' business or trade").
57 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, DR 4-101 (1981).

1990]

A GOLDEN RULE OF CANDOR

tionships inherently based on non-reciprocal promises or pledges,
on a necessary form of paternalism? I think not, but until we can
answer these questions, we will have to look more closely at the different places that lawyers and clients come together. Market lawyering is important, but it is not the whole story. To tell the story of
economic lies (dare I call them little "green" lies) may be to avoid
telling the story of more crucial lies (those that Professor Lerman's
lawyers would not tell, or the stories of the lawyers who would not
even agree to be interviewed).
IV.

CONCLUSION: PURSUING DECEIT OR EXTENSIONS OF THE
GOLDEN RULE

Professor Lerman has attempted to make public a secret we all
know-lawyers lie to their clients. She has informed us by using an
exploratory, non-systematic, empirical method to uncover what lawyers say they lie about. (Might they have deceived the researcher?)
They lie mostly about getting business, keeping business, and getting paid for business. There are lies about the process of legal practice (the terms of the relationship between lawyer and client) and lies
about the legal judgments that are made within the substantive corners of a client's matter. Professor Lerman proposes some regulations to deal with these issues. I leave to others the inevitable
arguments about whether these regulations will work or whether
they need some re-drafting. In essence, I support them because they
will make public and clear statements about punishable digressions
from a standard of truthfulness we apply to other businesses.
What Professor Lerman's article has revealed is that we need to
explore further what really matters when lawyers lie to clients. It is
not only the economic interests at stake, but questions about the
meaning of the lawyer-client relationship. General moral rules that
permit professionals (or anyone) to lie to avoid causing harm or to
benefit either the client or others may be offered as ajustification for
some forms of deceit, but such formulations are also paternalistic,
and it is that paternalism that must be examined and justified.
Because I think Professor Lerman's regulations are fine for the
fields they treat but not sufficient for the broader issues about lying, I
offer the Golden Rule of Candor for further scrutiny and objections.
It too offers a form of paternalism-lawyers deciding what they
would want to know if they were in the client's position and thus
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58
inverts, in a way, the standard notion of client-centered counseling,
and also leaves open the possibility that such decisions will only further reflect lawyer's self-interest. Yet it seems to me to have the kind
of common sense and appeal of the original Golden Rule-the kind
that we know is moral and correct-just difficult to live up to and
even more difficult to put into a professional ethics code.
Professor Lerman's article also hints at those other crucial issues
about lying and deception that must be further explored-both
empirically and in the possibility of drafting both general rules and
specific regulations. Do clients lie to their lawyers? Why? (This may
tell us more about clients' views about their lawyers than anything
else). How do lies of clients to lawyers alter the responsibilities, if at
all, that lawyers have to be truthful to clients (and vice versa)? How
does mutual candor affect the notions of reciprocity in the relationship alluded to above?
When do lawyers lie to other lawyers (we know they do thissome of it is justified in the rules5 9 ) and should they? Would my
Golden Rule apply there too? The rule would be that a lawyer
should be as candid with another lawyer as she would want that lawyer to be with her. I suspect this rule would raise different expectations, if we accept the notion that lawyers currently expect a certain
amount of "puffing" and deceit from each other. Could we change
this by rule?60
We could explore the unthinkable-when and how do lawyers
lie to tribunals and judges? Again the rules sanction such behavior
by not requiring lawyers to reveal certain facts, such as the presence
of witnesses, etc., but only to reveal adverse legal authority. 6 ' Do
the rules conform to actual practices of deceit or misrepresentation
by lawyers or does the incidence of lying track other dividing lines?
Should we re-open the question of trying to legislate greater candor
among and between actors in the legal system? 6 2 Can we trust law58 See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 32, at 147-50.
59 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1983) ("puffing"
permitted); White, supra note 35, at 927 (arguing that it is difficult to apply rules
about truthfulness to a lawyer during a negotiation because a negotiator must
mislead his opponent).
60 See Schwartz, The Professionalismand Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
669, 696 (1978) (recommending a new rule that prohibits a lawyer from "assisting a
client to achieve results which would be set aside in judicial proceedings").
61 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.3 (1983); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 7-102(A)(3).

62 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 4.2, 4.3 (Discussion Draft

1980); Hazard, Rectification of Client Fraud:Death and Revival of A ProfessionalNorm, 33
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yers to live by a professional Golden Rule that is contrary to the
rewards and incentives offered by an adversary system that prizes
zealotry over truth?6"
But these are questions for another day. Professor Lerman has
moved us to look into the depths of our deceitful souls and I, for
one, think we should continue to pursue this disturbing journey,
both for the purifying philosophical and moral aspects of the inquiry
and for the possibility of regulating away some of the lawyer's deceit
that has come to be so closely associated with the lawyer's role.
EMORY LJ. 271, 272, 300 (1984) (proposing a new rule to deal with an attorney's
handling of client fraud).
63 See Frankel, The Searchfor Truth, An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1039 (1975) ("[T]he gladiator using the weapons in the courtroom is not primarily
crusading after truth, but seeking to win.").

